Ayala the scientist equally paradoxically insisting on the importance of culture.

Where we do not disagree is in following Dobzhansky in seeing that—whether or not one believes in a deity—science is not necessarily the only truth or the only way of knowing. Unlike the New Atheists, because we disagree with someone, we do not necessarily think they are foolish or immoral. I do not know whether you would call Evolution, Explanation, Ethics, and Aesthetics science or something else, and I do not much care. There is much wisdom here and it deserves success with both professionals and students.

Michael Ruse, Program in the History & Philosophy of Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida

What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain.


The Illusion of God’s Presence: The Biological Origins of Spiritual Longing.

By John C. Wathey. Amherst (New York): Prometheus Books. $28.00. 463 p.; ill.; index. ISBN: 978-1-63388-074-0 (hc); 978-1-63388-075-7 (eb). 2016. Neuroscientist John Wathey had a mystical experience after members of his family almost died in a hiking adventure he had organized. In the wee hours of the following morning, wracked with guilt, he “suddenly felt the presence of a loving, caring, and understanding being” (p. 23). The presence was familiar and, as a boy, would have been attributed to God. But Wathey no longer believed in God and set out trying to understand the experience—one that has forever nurtured religious belief and is familiar to millions of believers.

Drawing on an impressive and wide-ranging literature—the book has 42 pages of notes and 56 pages of references—Wathey constructs a careful argument that adults sense the presence of God using the same innate neural circuitry with which evolution has programmed infants to sense the presence of a loving being. This neonatal impulse is the foundation of the loving God(s) at the center of so many religions, and the reason why Jesus told his followers to “be as little children.” In contrast, argues Wathey, judgmental, tyrannical deities—of the sort that would drown millions of people in a flood or send nonbelievers to an eternal hell—are rooted in our social instincts: evolution programmed our species to behave as though our hidden actions were being viewed by an omnipresent judge—what better way to keep us from cheating?

The author’s exposition is well-connected to experimental work, convincing in broad terms, and rewards a careful reading, albeit with some overreach, as in the claim that the practice of manipulating beads or a crucifix is a neonatal leftover from “an infantile urge to manipulate the breast while suckling” (p. 80). Protestants, to take but one example, do not have beads or any other manipulatives as a part of worship.

In the final part of the volume, Personal Implications, Wathey draws the conclusion to which he has been building—religion must go. In arguments that seem grafted onto the book, he “refutes” immortality. But he does this by refuting mind-body dualism, seemingly unaware that many leading Christian theologians abandoned dualism long ago. He also makes a Dawkinsian case for a “bright future” without religion.

The author does not engage the critical question of whether belief in God is compatible with the phenomena he describes. Christian thinkers have wrestled with new science ever since they learned from the Greeks that the Earth was round; or from Galileo that it moves; or from Darwin that things evolve. But these disruptions—like the evolutionary origins of the mechanisms that make spiritual experiences possible—are not at the heart of religious belief. Despite these quibbles, The Illusion of God’s Presence delivers provocative insights into one of the great puzzles of our species—our near-universal tendency to be religious.

Karl W. Giberson, Philosophy, Stonehill College, Hingham, Massachusetts


Edited by Brian Trenor, Bruce Ellis Benson, and Norman Wirzba. New York: Fordham University Press. $85.00 (hardcover); $53.00 (paper). xi + 242 p.; index. ISBN: 978-0-8252-6499-5 (hc); 978-0-8252-6500-8 (pb). 2015. This collection of 10 essays, with an excellent introduction by Brian Trenor, originated at a 2012 meeting of the Society for Continental Philosophy and Theology. The contributions are all broadly concerned with questions about the place of humans in nature. The hyphenated title of the volume alludes to Martin Heidegger’s central notion of being-in-the-world, but with a monothetic inflection. Several of the papers explore the concepts of creation and creatureliness.
Some of the contributions will be of limited interest to scientists or philosophers who are not either steeped in the continental philosophical tradition or interested in the details of different figures’ theological contributions. Here I would include Jeffrey Hanson’s essay on Emmanuel Levinas’ use of the notion of creation ex nihilo, as well as Christina Gschwandtner’s discussion of John Zizioulas and Jean-Louis Chrétienn. Susan Pyke’s essay, Dream Writing Beyond a Wounded World, is an exercise in literary interpretation that focuses on Emily Brontë as well as the poet Anne Carson. Rowan Williams, formerly Archbishop of Canterbury, engages with the thought of Father Sergei Bulgakov. Jarrod Longbons’ response to Williams opens with a discussion of Žižek.

The volume also contains a reflection on American suburban lawns by T. Wilson Dickinson, as well as a meandering essay on Henry David Thoreau by Edward Mooney. Janet Martin Sokkice’s contribution, Creation and the Glory of Creatures, is a scholarly discussion of the history and development of the doctrine of creation. Bruce Foltz develops a contrast between nature as physia and nature as kitos, emphasizing the idea that creation is gift, or even a face of the divine.

It is hard to recommend the particular essays in this volume to readers who are primarily interested in the life sciences, or in the relationship between science and religion, or in secular environmental philosophy. The contributors make little contact with natural science, and little effort to weigh in on the question of what environmental responsibilities we actually have.

Nevertheless, Treanor’s introduction is well worth a read. He frames the issues by characterizing human beings as “torn by two different impulses related to their ultimate belonging in nature” (p. 2). On one hand, we are pulled away from nature by the idea that we are somehow exceptional. On the other hand, we are pulled back to nature by reflecting on the “thoroughgoing ordinariness of our constitution and our fundamental kinship with all other living beings” (p. 2). This fascinating tension is reflected in Genesis, which insists that human beings are dependent creatures like any other (the naturalistic pull), while insisting that we alone are created in the image of God (the exceptionalist pull). Norman Wirzba, in The Art of Creaturely Life, explores this tension further, arguing that modern conceptions of the self have pulled us too far in the exceptionalist direction. As a corrective, he offers a reading of Genesis that is influenced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Wendell Berry, and Jean-Luc Nancy.

DEREK D. TURNER, Philosophy, Connecticut College, New London, Connecticut

A NEW BASIS FOR ANIMAL ETHICS: TELOS AND COMMON SENSE.

Since his 1972 PhD in philosophy from Columbia University, Bernard Rollin has spent most of his professional life raising public awareness and concern about our treatment of animals. He has written a number of books, including an autobiography whose delightful style is suggested by its title Putting the Horse Before Descartes: My Life’s Work on Behalf of Animals (2011. Philadelphia (PA): Temple University Press). The new book reviewed here is a summary of the philosophical thinking that underlies his mission. The author’s choice of the Aristotelian term “telos” to designate his fundamental concept is a bold one. Central to the creationist attack on Darwinian evolutionary theory is the teleological view that natural and human history reveal a divine purpose. Rollin, on the other hand, builds his case on Darwinian foundations and, as we will see, explicitly enlists Darwin as an ally in some of his arguments. He uses telos as a label for the ways in which aspects of an animal’s environment matter to it and to its purposes.

His work, and this book, focuses on two somewhat separate areas. Probably of greatest interest to the readers of the QRB are his arguments concerning what he calls the scientific ideology that has allowed researchers to turn a blind eye to animal suffering in their laboratories. Rollin’s goal is to exorcize the ghost of John B. Watson and the behaviorist vision that would regard as sentimental nonsense what the author calls the animal’s telos. He defends instead the commonsense view that takes as obvious an animal’s intentional engagement with its environment.

The data used to support the commonsense view are often dismissed as “merely anecdotal.” Rollin provides robust defense of the use of so-called anecdotal data. This is where he explicitly refers to Darwin’s writings and quotes liberally from the careful analysis by Darwin’s successor, George Romanes, of how he sifted and organized the stories he collected. As Rollin points out, Romanes anticipated and answered many of the objections to the use of such data.

The moral issues associated with the care of laboratory animals are also sometimes deflected by the claim that since science is value-free, such issues are irrelevant to scientific research. However, even those of us who accept the fact/value distinction are aware that science is a human enterprise filled with evaluations about the importance of various results. The lines of research that are chosen depend upon judgments of value. Even in my own